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Guantánamo in the Supreme Court:
Welcome Back, Welcome Back, Welcome Back
Marc Falkoff

Some of us eagerly peruse the Supreme Court’s case list the way a baseball fan
scours his team’s schedule when it’s first announced over the winter. Look, they’re
playing the Yankees in August – we’ve got to get tickets! We treat the Supreme Court
like a spectator sport, scouting out our favorite issues months before they’re argued.
Sure, we know intellectually that a tax case or an admiralty matter might end up being
unexpectedly gripping, and we can pretty much bet that Justice Scalia will draft a
concurring or dissenting opinion with a nice zinger or two in even the dullest of FTCA
disputes. But still, we look for those cases that make you want to buy a cheap plane
ticket to D.C. to catch the oral argument, or at least leave you hoping the Court will allow
C-SPAN to broadcast the proceeding’s audiotapes soon after the Solicitor General wraps
up his rebuttal.
This Term, like most, the Court’s docket is full of tasty cases, including an Eighth
Amendment challenge to execution by lethal injection (in Baze v. Rees), a First
Amendment test of a federal law criminalizing “virtual” child pornography (in United
States v. Williams), and – of all things – a Second Amendment attack on the District of
Columbia’s gun laws (in District of Columbia v. Heller). Woe to the poor clerks who get
stuck drafting bench memos for Kentucky Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, a Dormant
Commerce Clause case that only a true law geek could love.

But standing out on the Court’s docket this Term is one veritable, hands-down,
no-doubt-about-it blockbuster. Boumediene v. Bush is the latest of the Guantánamo
detainee cases to make it to our nation’s highest court, and it will be the third time that
the Justices take a metaphorical tour of Guantánamo in order to sort out some
fundamental issues concerning our country’s dedication to the rule of law in the age of
terror. Whichever way the Justices rule in Boumediene, no one doubts that the Court’s
opinion will be front page news when it’s issued sometime this spring or early summer,
or that it will quickly find its way into the casebooks and remain there for decades. (Full
disclosure – and trust me, you’ll need it – I am counsel for twelve of the sixty-odd
petitioners in this case, and I was on the briefs submitted to the Court.)
What’s the issue in Boumediene? In simplest terms, the case is a challenge to the
constitutionality of the Military Commissions Act, a statute in which Congress stripped
the federal courts of the power to hear habeas corpus petitions that were filed years ago
by prisoners at Guantánamo. None of these petitioners have been convicted of anything,
and none have even been charged with a crime. In fact, the Pentagon has made it clear
that most of these men never will be charged with anything.
The petitioners in Boumediene are just some of the 275 men who remain at
Guantánamo. Since the naval base opened for business as a prison camp in our war on
terror in January 2002, approximately 775 Muslim men have been detained there. These
are the men whom the current administration has famously called “the worst of the
worst” – men who, according to Gen. Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, “would gnaw through hydraulic lines in the back of a C-17 to bring it down.” Vice
President Cheney has told us that these are “people we picked up on the battlefield,
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primarily in Afghanistan. They’re terrorists. They’re bomb makers. They’re facilitators of
terror. They’re members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban.”
Of course, if the population of Guantánamo had really been made up of 775
radical-Islamic variations on Hannibal Lecter, one wonders why our government would
release 500 of them to their home countries, where almost all now live in freedom. It is
more reasonable, I would suggest, to believe that the administration’s rhetoric is
somewhat overheated and alarmist.
But you don’t have to take my word for it. The Seton Hall Law School analyzed
all of the documents concerning Guantánamo detainees that were released by the
Pentagon pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit. The Seton Hall folks
ignored everything that we habeas lawyers or our clients had to say, and instead focused
solely on the military’s own papers. What they found was that, contrary to Vice
President Cheney’s repeated assertions that these prisoners were picked up on the
battlefield trying to kill U.S. troops, in fact only 5% of the prisoners were taken into
custody on a battlefield. Fully 86% of the Guantánamo prisoners were captured by
Pakistani security forces at the border of Afghanistan, before being turned over to the
Americans at a time when we were offering bounties of $5000 a head for suspected
Taliban and Al Qaeda members. In fact, according to the military’s documents, only 8%
of the detainees are even accused of being Al Qaeda fighters.
One more piece of background information: Unlike in previous conflicts, our
troops did not hold field hearings (required by Article 5 of the Geneva Conventions and
Army Regulation 190-8) to determine whether persons who were wearing civilian dress
when captured were in fact enemy soldiers (which itself would be a heinous violation of
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the rules of war) or instead were actual civilians (as they appeared to be). There’s a
reason that unethical combatants dress as civilians – because sometimes civilians also
dress like civilians. During the first Gulf War, we held 1196 such field hearings, and we
determined that 886 detainees – fully 74% – were in fact civilians. No such hearings
occurred during the Afghan conflict.
I highlight these numbers simply to give you a sense of what the stakes are in the
Boumediene litigation. Scores of men claiming to be innocent teachers, aid workers or
students have been held in Guantánamo for more than six years. But, as of today, not a
single one has been granted a hearing before a judge where he could contest the legality
of his detention.
More than three years ago, in June 2004, the Supreme Court addressed the plight
of these prisoners for the first time. In Rasul v. Bush, the Court held that the federal
courts did have jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus claims brought by the Guantánamo
detainees, and that their allegations – “[that] although they have engaged neither in
combat nor in acts of terrorism against the United States, they have been held in
Executive detention for more than two years in territory subject to the long-term,
exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, without access to counsel and
without being charged with any wrongdoing” – unquestionably described custody in
violation of the Constitution.
In the aftermath of Rasul, lawyers (including me) filed habeas petitions for those
prisoners whose names we knew. Immediately, the administration asked the federal
courts to dismiss them all, arguing that even though the courts might have statutory
jurisdiction over the case (as per Rasul), nonetheless the prisoners did not have any
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constitutional rights (because they were “enemy combatants” held outside of “sovereign”
U.S. territory) and therefore their detention was per se legal.
Three years ago last week, on January 31, 2005, the judge before whom these
cases were consolidated denied the government’s motion to dismiss, holding that the
prisoners are entitled to fundamental protections of the Constitution and that they
therefore were entitled to habeas hearings. The government was allowed to appeal the
order on an interlocutory basis, which the court of appeals sat on for nearly a year
without deciding the case, while our clients waiting in their steel cells for their day in
court. Then, in December 2005, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act, which
withdrew the power of the federal courts to hear habeas petitions from Guantánamo
detainees.
That set the stage for the first return of the Guantánamo cases to the Supreme
Court. This time, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court held that Congress’s jurisdictionstripping statute was not meant to apply to Guantánamo prisoners who had already filed
habeas petitions. Recognizing that the habeas right was fundamental to the rule of law,
the Court refused to infer that Congress would take so momentous a step as to
retroactively strip this right from the detainees absent clearer language of its intent. After
Hamdan, we waited for the court of appeals to decide the government’s pending appeal
so that we could proceed with our habeas hearings. We waited, and we waited.
Then, in the waning days of Republican control, Congress passed the Military
Commissions Act, this time making it as clear as day that it intended the habeas right to
be stripped retroactively. In short order, the court of appeals dismissed our habeas cases
for lack of jurisdiction.
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We sought certiorari from the Supreme Court and were initially denied the
opportunity to return one last time. In a “statement” respecting the denial of cert, Justices
Stevens and Kennedy explained that, although the case was of profound importance,
Congress had provided an alternative remedy to habeas corpus – direct review in the
court of appeals, limited to the sole question of whether the military had followed its own
procedures when it determined that the Guantánamo detainees were “enemy combatants.”
Exhaust that remedy, we were told, and then come back if you think it was an inadequate
substitute for habeas.
This was a stunning setback for us, because we knew that, notwithstanding the
self-evident inadequacy of the DTA process, it would be literally years before we could
exhaust a procedure that had been made up out of whole cloth by Congress. It was going
to be no easy task for an appellate court to come up with procedures for adversarial
testing of a non-adversarial military status tribunal, as the “combatant status review
tribunals” were.
At the military’s review tribunals, which were convened more than three years
after the detainees were first taken into custody, the men were for the first time informed
of the accusations against them and were allowed to speak in their defense. But they
were not made privy to the classified evidence that the military claimed supported the
enemy combatancy determination, and they were not allowed the assistance of a lawyer
even if, like my clients, they already had a lawyer. Instead they were provided with a
personal representative – a military officer who was supposed to explain the hearing
process and “assist” the detainee. But this personal representative had no confidential or
privileged relationship with the prisoner, and by regulation was obliged to report to his
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superiors any intelligence he learned from his charge. In addition, if an officer was
otherwise qualified to be a personal representative, he was nonetheless forbidden by
regulation from serving in that role if he also happened to be a lawyer.
Given rules like this, as well as a presumption that all of the government’s
evidence was true and that the detainee was an “enemy combatant,” it’s not surprising to
find tribunal transcripts that read like a cross between Kafka and an Abbott-and-Costello
routine. Here’s just a snippet from the tribunal of one of my clients:
Detainee: Regarding [the charge that] I worked at various guesthouses and
offices. What was the work?
Tribunal President: I cannot answer that. This is the first time we have seen this
evidence. I know nothing more than what is written here.
Detainee: The same with me. I don’t know anything about this…. Regarding [the
charge that I was] frequently seen at Usama Bin Ladin’s side. Who saw me?
Tribunal President: I do not know.
Detainee: If it says, was frequently seen, you have to prove that. I am aware of
the laws and the courts…. Regarding, also, the detainee attended various other
training camps and resided at a Kandahar, Afghanistan guesthouse. What training
camps?
Tribunal President: Did you attend any training camps while you were in
Afghanistan?
Detainee: Never.
Tribunal President: Then that answers the question.
Detainee: That I resided at a Kandahar guesthouse. This guesthouse, do you
mean my house, was my house a guesthouse?
Tribunal President: I would assume so.
Detainee: If it was my house then of course I was there. But, if it is another
person’s guesthouse, then no.
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Another detainee was found to be an enemy combatant based on the discovery of
his “alias” on the hard drive of a computer owned by someone who was suspected of
having an association with Al Qaeda. The detainee told his tribunal that he didn’t have
any aliases, and asked what the alias was. The answer was that the information was
classified and could not be shared with him. “Well, where was the computer, whose was
it?” Again, the answer was that the information was classified. “When was this?” The
answer, “Can’t tell you.”
We might have had to wait years before we could present transcripts like this to
the Supreme Court in order to convince them that a court of appeals rubber stamp of
procedures that resulted in hearings like these was an inadequate substitute for habeas
corpus, the Great Writ of Liberty. But then we got lucky. Lt. Col. Stephen Abraham,
who sat on several of these status tribunals, drafted a declaration exposing the kangaroocourt nature of the proceedings. He explained, among other things, that even when a
tribunal reached a determination that a prisoner was not an enemy combatant, the panel
was often commanded by superiors to perform a “do-over.”
After we submitted Abraham’s declaration to the Supreme Court as part of a
motion for reconsideration of the denial of cert in Boumediene, a nearly unprecedented
event occurred: The Court granted the reconsideration motion and reversed its denial of
certiorari, agreeing to hear our case. No one can remember the last time the Court
reversed itself in this manner.
Oral argument in Boumediene took place on December 5. The petitioners,
including my clients, have argued that by passing the Military Commissions Act,
Congress has unconstitutionally suspended the writ of habeas corpus – something that the
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Suspension Clause allows Congress to do only “when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it.” This argument requires us to persuade the Court (1)
that the Guantánamo detainees are “protected” by the Suspension Clause and have a
constitutional right to the fundamental protections of the writ of habeas corpus, and (2)
that the alternative review procedure that Congress set up in the Detainee Treatment Act
is neither an adequate nor an effective substitute for true habeas corpus review. The
government’s response is (1) that the Guantánamo detainees are entitled to no
constitutional protections because they are non-citizens held outside of sovereign U.S.
territory, and (2) that even if they are entitled to the protections of the writ, the appeals
court review of the combatant status review tribunals is an adequate substitute for habeas.
The stakes in this case are large. If the Court holds that the Constitution does not
apply at Guantánamo – a territory over which the United States exercises exclusive
jurisdiction and control – then the Guantánamo detainees are truly being held in a legal
black hole, where there is no law to protect them. (The same would probably not be true,
for example, at our detentions centers in Iraq or Afghanistan, where local law remains
operative, at least in the background. At Guantánamo, neither Cuban nor Spanish nor
any other law applies besides U.S. law.) On the other hand, if the Court holds that the
Guantánamo detainees may pursue their habeas claims, potentially U.S. detainees around
the globe would likewise be entitled to access to our federal courts.
Whether that would be a good thing or bad thing remains to be seen. I’ve got my
opinions … but that will have to wait until after we learn what the Court does in
Boumediene.
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